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[Abstract] 
The paper estimates both the gender gap in wage and net schooling enrollment from 
Vietnam household data. The results imply a reflection of gender wage gap in the 
labor market in hazard of school withdrawals. Generally, males have higher incentive 
to terminate their schooling to join the labor force. Males would have 43.8 percent 
higher in participating the labor market and gain 18.4 percent of wage per hour higher 
than females. Also, we observe 16–44.4 percent lower in probability for males to 
enroll in school, especially, the school withdrawal rate accelerates at higher speed 
after the age of primary school. Meanwhile, females would have an incentive to 
complete junior, senior high school and 3–year college thanks to higher speed gain in 
wage. Besides, family having a combination of a household head working for a state–
owned firm and his spouse working as self–employed would best facilitate their co–
residing children and grandchildren for more years of schooling. Finally, the current 
education subsidy and tuition fee reduction policy do minimal to reduce the hazard of 
school dropouts among beneficiaries. 
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During the economy transition, Vietnam have enjoyed high gross domestic product 
growth rate for almost over 5 percent per annum from 1990–2008 (GSO 2010) with 
increasing number of “active” firms1 from 42,288 in 2000 up to 155,771 in 2007 
(GSO 2012). Such shift needs more skilled workers and skill–based wage would have 
established. For example, higher income for workers in productions and services 
would be a measure for newly established firms to absorb labors. Thus the choice of 
schooling more than primary education would become more important to each 
individual’s future income. These assumptions encourage us to verify and compare 
the corresponding changes in school enrollment by gender. 
The main purpose of the study is to investigate the gender gap in both wage 
and net school enrollment using data from the 2008 Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Survey (VHLSS). Also, we are interested in the efficiency of policies on 
education and linkage between parents’ (grandparents’) wage to the schooling choices 
of the children. Unlike previous studies, we examine the wage in the labor market by 
using in the Heckman sample selection models with greatest combination of 33 
occupational types and 88 industries where 101,306 individuals are working. 
Meanwhile, the school enrollment gender gap is analyzed in Cox hazard models and 
regarding the effect the family background as well as education policies. In addition, 
we link education premium with schooling choice decision by using some control 
variables (which are highly valued in the labor market) in the hazard models and 
comparing the marginal effects between returns to education and hazard of dropouts. 
 We obtain four major findings. First, males are more likely to involve in 
salary work, at about 43.8 percent higher in probability and benefit 18.4 percent 
higher wage than females. However, females have a relatively increment incentive of 
4.51–9.49 percent for an additional degree from junior high school up to 3–year 
college. Second, males are facing higher school dropout hazard and the higher 
acceleration to dropout than females from age 12–22. Third, we find a combination of 
a household head working for a state–owned firm and his spouse working as self–
employed would reduce the hazard of school dropout to the lowest. Finally, although 
the tuition fee reduction policy is widespread to almost 40 percent of individuals aged 
7–22, the policy has minimal connection to an additional year in schooling. Similarly, 
the education subsidy does not create any statistically significant gain for net school 
enrollment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
previous advances in estimating the gender gap in wage and school dropouts as well 
as theory bases for our hypothesis. Section 3 introduces the data used and Section 4 
describes our empirical methods. Section 5 details our findings. Section 6 provides 
our conclusions. 
                                            
1
 “Active” means the firms actually have employee to do business and create some business cost 
during the year. 
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2 Background to gender gap in wage and schooling choice 
2.1 Advances in estimating gender wage gap and school choices 
The returns of schooling have been examined for several decades since Mincer (1958). 
The returns of schooling would vary among population with observable factors such 
as school quality and education of the parents (Card 1999). Heckman, Lochner and 
Todd (2008) estimate the marginal internal rates of return for different schooling 
levels and find relatively larger returns to graduating from high school than to 
graduating from college given that both have been increasing overtime. 
Schooling contains endogeneity problems. The common is the unobservable 
of “ability”. Second, schooling would be the optimization behavior of individuals and 
families (Griliches 1977). Third, the aggregate log of earnings can be right skewed in 
contrast with original Roy model that assumes log skills are normally distributed 
(Heckman and Honoré 1990). Furthermore, we learn from Card (1999) that it would 
be difficult to decide whether the higher education cause higher earnings observed 
from better educated individuals or whether individuals with greater earning capacity 
chose to have more years of schooling. Thus we realize intercepting the schooling 
decision in the early life would be important because wage earning capacity is still 
potential. 
The estimation technique is improved significantly by the development of 
theory and econometric methods to get an insight to unobservable characteristics, 
ability. Measurement errors can be justified by using potentially instrumental 
variables such as parental education (Willis and Rosen 1979), tuition fees, minimum 
school–leaving age, college proximity  (Card 2001) and test score (Card 1999), and 
using identical twins data (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994) where genetic difference in 
endowments can be controlled. 
There are some explanations for gender wage gap. The first reason could be 
the difference in gender specific factors. For example, women are likely to be 
involved in shorter and discontinuous work due to childbirth, child rearing and 
housework (Mincer and Polachek 1974) and time constraint between market work and 
house work (Becker 1985). Thus women are more likely to have less experience 
and/or less incentive to invest or be invested in on–job training and education. 
Similarly, women with different marital status and number of children devote 
different proportion of her lifetime to the world of work (Mincer and Polachek 1974). 
Second, the wage structure (distribution) could explain for the gap. Fortin and 
Lemieux (1998) indicate the decline in the gender wage gap during 1979–1991 was 
highest at the middle centile of the wage distribution. This is due to the distribution of 
wage function of females became less skewed to the right and had similar shape to 
that of males. Also, we acknowledge that the gender wage gap would be lower at the 
entry of the labor market, larger in the middle and the other end of exit (Tansel and 
Bodur 2012). Topel (1994) shows wage inequality differs by regions. On the other 
aspect, changing the nature and condition of work, i.e increasing computer use, would 
open more job opportunity to females (Weinberg 2000). There is also an unexplained 
gap. For example, Fortin (2005) finds the impact of soft factors such as greed, 
ambition, altruism, locus of control, gender role attitude, family values and income 
expectations would have impact on behaviors, wages and gender wage gap. Finally, 
the gender wage gap can be a purely gender discrimination. Goldin and Rouse (2000) 
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find the shift to “blind” auditions can explain 25 percent of the increase in the 
percentage of female members in the orchestras from 1970–1996. Because music 
directors in charge of hiring new musicians, publicly disclosed their belief that 
females had lower musical talent. 
Literature reports several ways to decompose the gap. Detected gender 
differences in wage consist of differences in the endowments of the sampled 
individuals, in coefficients and unexplained part, probably due to discrimination. 
Works by Oaxaca (1973) and Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) are of the extent and 
later widely applied in other studies. However, the decomposition considers only the 
mean wage difference in the two latter parts. Thus quantile regressions further 
examine whether the gender wage gap is larger (smaller) in either ends of wage 
distribution (Buchinsky 1994, Gardeazabal and Ugidos 2005, Tansel and Bodur 
2012).  
Some studies examine the school choice focusing in college degrees in 
developed countries and primary schools in developing countries. For example, Willis 
and Rosen (1979) observe the expected lifetime earnings would influence the decision 
to attend college. Brown and Corcoran (1997) find the gender difference in choosing 
schooling content relates to gender wage gap among college graduates. Meanwhile, 
increasing returns to education would raise (primary) school enrollment (Foster and 
Rosenzweig 1996). Similarly, increasing wealth would induce parents invest more for 
children’s education in Vietnam (Glewwe and Jacoby 2004). However, literature 
reports some time lags or even mismatches at the time that individual left school. 
Card (2001) indicates different individuals would finish their schooling at the time 
when the marginal return to last year of schooling would either above or under the 
average marginal return of the population. However, using the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1979, Cunha and Heckman (2007) find 50 percent of the 
ex–post variance in returns to college is predictable at the time the individual making 
the choice of schooling. More specifically, the study predicts that 13.86 percent of 
high school graduates would rather be college graduates and 17.15 percent of college 
graduates would have stopped their schooling with a high school diploma. Besides, 
Glewwe and Kremer (2006) suggest that the elasticity of demand for schooling is 
more likely higher for females than males in developing countries. Thus policies and 
programs on education may increase enrollment rates of females without having the 
intended target. 
2.2 Theory base for our hypothesis 
In decision theory, individuals make decision on schooling choice by 
maximizing their utilities. We assume that individuals are able to evaluate their 
learning ability. We also assume that their learning ability is unlimited given that they 
are provided with enough resources to learn. Hence, individuals consider the expected 
present value of an additional year in schooling,  , versus the expected forgone 
income in       years if they work and the cost of learning, and other 
unobservable utilities such as preference on learning, psychic cost, job searching cost.  
                 
                                                                                 
         (1) 
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More specifically, individuals make decision of schooling choice at time   
                                                –    –                   
         (2) 
in which,                is sum of expected future income after obtained the degree 
of   years of schooling.                   are cost to obtain the degree and 
expected forgone income at current education level within   additional year of 
schooling.   is other unobservable (unmeasurable) utilities such as: abilities, 
preference, psychic cost (job searching cost), etc. 
We suppose that all individuals can observe the wage function and/or 
distribution, e.g from the wages of their relatives and acquaintances. The present 
value of current expected log wage (if the individual is working) is 
         
               
            
 ,     (3) 
where   is the schooling premium. Therefore, expected forgone wage at current 
education level can explain for the education choice. The wage gender gap, in turn, as 
a part of wage function, can also explain for the education choice. 
3 Data 
The data in use is cross section data, common known as Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Survey 2008. The sample size is 45,945 households with 289,948 
individuals. The sampling method is two–stage stratified by using 3,045 sample units 
taken from master sample of population census. Two parts of the survey are 
containing necessary information about income and education.  
For income analysis, our definition of labor force and definition of working 
are different from the concept from the survey. The labor force in our concept consists 
of two types of people, working and non–working individuals. Working individuals 
are defined as people who have wage (salary) in the year 2007 for their main job. By 
the definition of the survey, main job is an activity consuming most time among other 
jobs (economic activities). In Vietnam, an individual can have more than a single job 
and economic activities to generate income. For example, an individual can work as 
civil servant during the day and as self–employed for family business at night, such as 
producing ceramic crafts. VHLSS 2008 collects detailed information of first main 
job
2
, the second job and so on. Non–working individuals are those who do not have 
wage (salaries) for their first main job. They are seeking for such kind of job or doing 
some other activities as substitutions for the main job. Besides, we further restrict the 
labor force by age and possibility to (re)enter to the labor force. Individuals in the 
labor force are at the age permitted by Vietnamese Laws of Labor. They have neither 
retired nor reached to the age of retirement by the laws. In addition, they are neither 
enrolling in any kind of school nor expecting for school entrance exams. Labor force 
does not contain individuals who are disabilities, too weak to work, facing serious 
illness and taking early retirements. Descriptions of selected sample for income 
analysis are as in Table 1. 
                                            
2
 Main job is defined in VHLSS as earnings required the highest number of time devoted to. If an 
individual has two equal time spending on jobs, highest earnings job is recorded as main job. 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
From the sample, we can observe a “labor force” relatively young with an 
average of 36.33 years of age and females occupy 49.25 percent. In addition, paid 
work as main job (most time consuming and highest earning job) attracts only 33 
percent of the total labor force. 43.97 percent of individuals are self–employed, 72.59 
percent of which is in agriculture, forestry and fishery sectors. Therefore, we argue 
that sample selection would be the most serious problem in estimating the returns to 
schooling. Also, we notice that the distribution of wage distribution of both males and 
females are right–skewed although that of males is less than that of females as seen in 
Graph 1. The gender gap would be minimal in the far right tail whereas the gender 
gap would be significantly different in the left and the right middle of the distribution.  
[INSERT GRAPH 1 HERE] 
For education analysis, we define net school enrollment as individuals who are 
enrolling in any kind of school at the year 2008. However, the individuals are 7–22 
years of age and do not repeat any grade
3
 since they have entered to primary school. 
This is important as suggested by Glewwe and Kremer (2006)4. Besides, we define 
school leavers as individuals aged 7–22 and have a record of school attendance5. The 
sum of school enrollments and school leavers confound the total individuals who have 
been made decision on schooling. In order to further drill on the time of making 
decision, we construct two panels. Panel 1 is as what we defined. Panel 2 further 
restricts to individuals who were enrolling in a school in the year 2007. Therefore, 
Panel 1 deals better with accumulation of schooling choice made by individuals of 
interest in all past years while Panel 2 facilitates to analyze the school decision made 
in 2007. Panel 2 also enables us to integrate some educational policy variables. 
Descriptive statistics for the two panels are shown in Table 2 and 3.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 AND 3 HERE] 
4 Empirical methods and specifications 
4.1 Heckman sample selection with two steps for wage regression 
We apply Heckman sample selection model with two steps (Heckman 1979) to 
estimate the gender wage gap as we are unable to observe wage of approximately 68 
percent of total individuals who are engaged (ready to be engaged) with some 
business activities6.  
We acknowledge that the model is not able to decompose the gender gap into 
                                            
3
 Appendix 1 shows descriptions of Vietnam education system. 
4
 The study indicates principals and teachers have incentives to exaggerate the number of students 
enrolled in developing countries. Thus the definition of net enrollment rate is more appropriate. Net 
enrollment rate is the number of children enrolled in a particular level of schooling who are of the age 
associated with that level of schooling divided by all children of the age associated with that level of 
schooling (Glewwe and Kremer 2006). 
5
 We acknowledge that 1,327 individuals (2.5 percent) in Panel 1 aged 7 or above have never entered 
to any school. 
6
 Glewwe and Kremer (2006) record this problem is serious in developing countries. 
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difference of endowments, of coefficients and of unobservable factors. Also, the 
model does not consider the interaction between the coefficients of individual 
characteristics with the gender. In addition, the model does not divide data into 
different quantiles of wage and consider the gender wage gap in each quantile. 
However, we would argue that sample selection would be the most serious problem in 
detecting the gender wage gap in Vietnam. Besides, the general mean of gender wage 
gap is of our interest because it is easiest to be observed by any individual. Thus the 
general mean of gender wage gap is more likely to be the signal for each individual to 
align their years of schooling at their early life. The quantile gender wage gap would 
be more precise and more important for individuals at their mid–career. Thus we try 
to reduce the effect of occupational types and industries’ differences, which are more 
likely to lead to different gender wage gap in different part of the wage distribution, 
by introducing corresponding control variables. 
We assume that the selection can be predicted from the individual 
characteristics    such as sex, marital status (Das et al. 2003), age, work experience, 
from the place of residence such as rural or urban, employment opportunities 
(economic regions can be a proxy), and highest educational attainment. In the 
selection stage,  
𝑧′   𝑠 𝑙 𝑐   {
1  𝑖𝑓𝑧    𝛽  𝜀 ≥ 𝑧
 
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑧 < 𝑧
  
.    (4) 
In the outcome stage,  
𝑦     𝑤𝑎𝑔    ′ 𝛽′  𝜖.      (5) 
The wage estimate is Mincer regression and can be explained by  ′  characteristics 
such as sex, age, working experience, rural or urban area of residence, economic 
regions, highest diploma obtained, highest vocational degree obtained, characteristics 
of the enterprise such as types of ownership and industries. 
4.2 Hazard model for the probability of leaving school 
Meanwhile, we deploy a hazard model to estimate the probability of withdrawing 
(dropout) from school for individuals aged 7–22. We omit all individuals who are 
attending in schools but their ages are more than 2 years difference to the age of an 
individual starting primary school at 7 years of age and continuously adding one 
grade annually. The period of study is the time since an individual enters primary 
school at 7 years of age until either the individual leaves the school or the survey ends. 
At the age 7, all individuals are considered to be at school as primary school is 
compulsory in Vietnam. The individuals are also at risk of dropout every year after 
the age 7. If an individual does not have a status of “at school” in 2008, the individual 
is considered as already left school (termination). If the individual is “at school”, the 
individual is regarded as right censored data. It is reasonable to assume that all 
censored data will fail or finish their schooling sometime after 2008.  
Suppose that the year of schooling, started from 7 years of age when an 
individual enters primary school and finishes when the individual terminates 
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schooling, follows      7. The survival function, indicating the probability that an 
individual continue for higher school grade at time  , is then      1       
      .      1 at   0. The hazard function,     , is the instantaneous rate of 
failure or the rate of terminating school in such a short period of time: 
            
               
  
 
    
    
.     (6) 
The cumulative hazard function is 
     ∫         ∫
    





          .    (7) 
In general, the likelihood function of an individual experiencing school termination is 
                  (8) 
In case of right censored data 
              (9) 
Thus the likelihood function of both censored and uncensored individuals can be 
rewritten as 
  ∏         
   
                 
          (10) 
 
4.3 Specifications 
4.3.1 Dependent variables 
In wage regression, the dependent variable is logarithm of wage per hour in 12 month 
prior the survey. The wage per hour is the ratio of total wage by total working hour. 
The total wage is a sum of the total wage, bonus and any other income related to wage. 
Meanwhile, the total working hour is a product of sum of total hour working per day, 
total days of working in a month, and total months of working in 12 months prior to 
the survey. 
In school dropout analysis, the dependent variable is the years of education. If 
the individual has left school, years of education is the highest school grade ever be 
completed. If the individual is enrolling in a school by the time of survey, it is the 
current grade minus 1 by the definition of VHLSS. 
4.3.2 Independent variables 
Independent variables in wage analysis include individuals characteristics 
such as sex, marital status, age, working experience, highest obtained academic 
degree, highest obtained professional degree, residing area (rural/urban and economy 
regions), ownership of the enterprises (classified by GSO), 88 industries where the 
employers are mainly involving, and 33 occupation types (classified by GSO). 
In school dropout estimates, independent variables consist of individuals and 
family characteristics including sex, household income (household income adjusted 
by root squared of number people in the household), whether the individual is the 
only son and/or the grandchild of the household head and residing area (rural/urban 
and economy regions). Also, we add information about the household head and his 
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, including education, their employers’ type if they are working. This would 
be a reasonable assumption as the difference in wage among household head and his 
spouse, if any, would be the easiest to be observed. Besides, the information could 
help to control a possible interference of household heads (spouses) to the schooling 
choice of children within the household, given the heads (spouses) acknowledges of 
their wage premium. Also, working in different employer types may result in different 
time schedule which might influence the time for rearing or support their children 
(grand children). However, since there are 5,498 (1,327) individuals missing 
information about their household head (head’s spouse), we analyze the information 
in a separate estimation. Also, in a separate data, the Panel 2, we add three dummies 
for the status of education policy recipients such as tuition fee reduction, scholarship, 
education subsidies. Ratio of tuition fee over the total expenditure on individuals’ 
education is included. The information only appears among individuals who 
experienced school enrollment in 2007. Detailed explanation for both dependent and 
independent variables can be seen in Table 2, 3 and 4. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
In addition, we introduce an interaction term between sex and the variable of 
interests. In wage function, it is the highest degree obtained by the individuals. If the 
interaction term is significant, the coefficient of the interaction term can explain for 
the difference in the incentive to complete the highest degree among the sex of 
interest. In a hazard model for school dropouts, the corresponding coefficient would 
show the difference in effort to add an additional year in schooling among the sex of 
interest. As the magnitude of the interaction effect in non–linear models is not 
equivalent to the marginal effect of the interaction term and the its statistical 
significance is not calculated by standard software (Ai and Norton 2003). Thus, we 
apply the tips by Buis (2007) to calculate and interpret the interaction term. 
4.4 Marginal effect over sex and the variable of interest 
There are three main reasons for us to conduct marginal effect over sex and the 
variable of interest. The first is that Heckman et al. (2006) present evidence that the 
marginal return does not equal to the average return which is often estimated from 
Mincer regression. The second is lying to the fact of the coefficient of the interaction 
term in non–linear models is not equivalent to the marginal effect. Besides, we 
acknowledge that the marginal effect to complete a degree would be higher in the 
final year of degree completion (sheepskin effects). Heckman, Lochner and Todd 
(2008) indicate that the levels and trends in rates of return estimated from Mincer 
model are misleading for many schooling levels. 
5 Results 
5.1 Differences in labor participation rate and gender gap in wage 
Estimates of the probability of participation would capture the general image of the 
labor market of Vietnam, as shown in Table 5. People living in different economic 
                                            
8
 In fact, we convert all female household head as household head spouse and male household head 
spouse as household head for the selected data. 
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regions and/or rural (urban) area also experience different labor participation rate. 
Highest of these rates are Southeast and Red River Delta (as the base). Probably, the 
two regions embrace two largest cities in Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi 
where most firms are located. In general, estimates show individuals with higher level 
of education tend to have higher participation rate, which agrees with Becker (1962) 
or they are self–selected to the labor market. Meanwhile, FDI firms, state–owned 
firms and private–owned firms would be attractive to employees, at least novice, for 
paying 29.6, 18.9 and 15.3 percent higher wage per hour than collectives and family 
owned business, respectively. However, the percentage of individuals having more 
than 12 years of schooling among state–owned firms in our selected sample is 64.35 
whereas the numbers are 27.05, 28.47 and 3.38 in FDI firms, private firms and family 
business, respectively. Thus state–owned firms’ employees would have a different 
pay scale which may put heavy weights on education degrees. In addition, the 
employees would have added up their degrees while working as a response to that 
scale. Similarly, a 3–year vocational course graduates can earn 11.5 percent higher 
than the one without the degree. Besides, while coefficients of region dummies in the 
first step illustrate the probability to participate in the labor market, the corresponding 
coefficients in the wage regression show the regional wage difference. Though Red 
River Delta would be where proportion of wage earners is the country second highest 
rate, the region is also the country second lowest wage paid per hour, holding other 
else constant. Besides, the return to education would be increasing if individuals hold 
higher degree up to as equal as master degree and then slightly decreases. Especially, 
upper secondary graduates would receive 15.4 percent higher wage than the base 
while the return would jump to 33.7 if individuals hold some college degrees. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Females are less likely to participate in labor market, with 43.8 percent lower 
in probability and suffer a wage of 18.4 percent lower (as seen in Table 5). Especially, 
the interaction term between gender and the highest degree show an interesting 
feature. Although experiencing from the wage gap of 12.4 percent lower than males, 
comparing among females, females would have additional wage gains by higher 
education. As shown in Table 5, the interaction terms between female and degree of 
junior, senior high school, 3–year college, and 4 or 5 year university can explain for a 
corresponding 4.51, 6.19, 9.49 and 6.0 percent wage gains. The increment in wage 
gains would be an incentive for females to accomplish the four year degrees. 
Nevertheless, the incentive would be minimal in primary school as the corresponding 
coefficient is statistically insignificant. It is very likely that compulsory education 
during primary school with no tuition fee fill the gap if any. 
5.2 Differences in probability to leave school and the gender gap 
In general, individuals at age groups 12–15, 16–18, 19–22 would be 100, 243.8 and 
419.6 percent more likely to leave school than the age group 7–11 as seen in the Panel 
1, Table 6. There are several possible reasons. First, the age group 7–11 is under 
compulsory education. Second, individuals have different ability, and people with 
higher ability are scarce than the average. Third, there would be lower accessibility to 
higher level of education, such as under–developed higher education services. Fourth, 
individuals may leave school for economic reason, such as for working. However, in 
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Panel 2 consisting of relatively higher ability people, the corresponding coefficients 
show a decrease from 85.4 to 98.31 percent in dropout rate in older age groups. 
Sheepskin effect, the phenomenon of highest return to the last grade of one education 
level, can also be an explanation. As individuals try to get the degree, they would not 
dropout in the middle of one school level. This agrees with our interpretation in Panel 
1. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Besides, differences in school dropouts among economic regions are 
significant. In Panel 1 shown in Table 6, individuals in North Central Coast would be 
5.3 percent less likely to dropout. Interestingly, the region is often considered as 
poorest. Mekong River Delta region would have the highest school dropout rates in 
the country, with 148.2 percent probability higher than Red River Delta. In Panel 2, 
differences among economic regions are less serious but the evidence of country’s 
highest dropout rate in Mekong River Delta is confirmed with 15.8 percent difference. 
Individuals in North East are 27.2 percent higher in probability to dropout school. In 
contrast, South East would have a lower dropout probability.  
Family background would help to control different aspect to the probability to 
dropout as decision of school choice would be an interaction among individuals, their 
family (Griliches 1977) and the society. We argue for the role of society such as 
educational policies and labor market settings. We prefer to add such information of 
family background to trade off with bias selection (4,475 individuals are left behind). 
Apart from the core variables which have consistent effect in the previous analysis, 
information of family background would explain some interesting facts. In Table 6, 
analysis 2, higher educated household head and his spouse would lead to 7.9–8.7 
lower probability to leave school earlier. Interestingly, there is a different attitude of 
household head and spouse to their children and/or grandchildren. We once observed 
the highest returns to schooling among individuals working for FDI, state–owned, and 
private firms, respectively. However, the school dropout hazard is highest among 
families having the head working for FDI firms (62.5 percent higher) and lowest 
among a combination of the head working for state–owned firms (with 13.3 percent 
lower) and the head spouse is self–employed (with 10 percent lower). Where the head 
is in FDI firms (in private firms), their children and grandchildren are facing an 
excessive dropout hazard of 62.5 (30.5) percent as shown in Table 6 (7), analysis 2. It 
could be a reflection of wage inequality to the next generation’s schooling choice 
either in an active or inactive manner. A possible explanation is that the difference 
can be a result of difference in time flexibility of the head (head spouse) available for 
child rearing. If education can be a proxy for skill–based pay which is more likely to 
applicable in non–state sector, the differences between effect of FDI (private) firms 
and that of family business are more likely the time rearing the children. For instance, 
if the head spouse is self–employed, she would gain more flexible working time and 
thus having more time to educate the next generation.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Household income level would lower down the probability of dropout to 7.2–
30.4 percent as shown in Table 6 and 7. In addition, if the individuals are living with 
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grandparents, they are more likely to be kept in schools with 18.1–51.8 percent 
increment of probability compared with the others living without grandparents. 
Notably, the difference between the individual who is the only co–residing son and 
the base is 18.1 percent higher as shown in Table 6, analysis 1. We once try to 
establish one–daughter family to compare single gender effect. Unfortunately, the 
sample does not contain any of such family. Probably, the son preference leads to a 
higher investment on the education of the only son in the family. However, in other 
analysis, the corresponding coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
Panel 2 allows us to have an insight to the effect of educational policies on the 
dropout rates (net enrollment rates). A tuition fee reduction would contribute minimal 
to the dropout rates of the individuals despite that 41.9 percent of the individuals are 
the beneficiary of this policy (see Table 4). Similarly, education subsidy receivers 
would have the same probability as others to dropout. In contrast, scholarship 
receivers would benefit 29.2–30 percent higher in probability to continue their 
schooling. Perhaps, there would be two kinds of scholarship receivers: those who 
have excellent academic records and those who have some economic disadvantages. 
Thus if individuals are only the former, the coefficients show their ability to continue 
higher education level. If they are the later or both, it is difficult to have policy 
implication from the result. In addition, the ratio of tuition fee payment over the total 
expenditure on education would have an interesting implication for policies on 
education. If the ratio increases one unit, it explains for 71.6 percent increase in 
probability to be in schools in the following year. In Vietnam, public education 
dominates and the tuition fee is set by the authorities. Thus policies to decrease or 
increase tuition fee cannot determine themselves the probability to dropout rates. 
Instead, the sensitive to education expense and the other component of education 
expense than tuition fee should be considered. On the other hand, if tuition fee is 
almost all education expense, individuals are more likely to be in school, otherwise 
the inverse applies. 
The gender could explain for 16–44.4 percent higher in probability for females 
to stay in school. In other words, females are less likely to terminate their schooling 
than males. However, among females, those aged 16–18 are 27.2–31.5 percent more 
likely to dropout than other females aged 19–22 in Panel 2. We will further present 
the difference in the following sub–section. 
5.3 Gender gap in wage and school withdrawals 
In wage regression analysis, we have estimated the interaction term between gender 
and the degree obtained, which could be an incentive for females to stay longer in 
school. The result suggests that the incentive would explain for the lower school 
dropout rate of females. More specifically, females would have incentive to complete 
junior, senior high school, 3–year college and 4 or 5 year university than males. In 
hazard model for school dropouts, we observe an inverse corresponding gender 
dropout gap of 27.2–31.5 percent.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
We further analyze the marginal effect over gender and one variable of 
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interest in both wage and school dropout analysis. In general, males often have higher 
marginal effect over wage per schooling level as shown in Table 8. The difference 
would explain for higher (lower) relative school withdrawal (dropout) rates among 
lower (higher) ability individuals. In addition, the corresponding wage gap (the speed 
of gains) would still be the incentive for females staying longer in junior, senior high 
school and 3–year college. In Table 8, the marginal effect is higher for females when 
moving from primary school to junior high school (1.801 compared with 1.052), from 
junior high school to senior high school (2.945 and 3.015), and form senior high 
school to 3–year college (53.466 and 164.315). Meanwhile, as seen in Table 9, the 
marginal effect of hazard rate (also, the speed lost) over sex and age group is higher 
for males in all age groups. These results confirm and validate our previous analysis. 
Females have incentive of future return to education to move (complete) up to junior, 
senior high school and 3–year college. In contrast, males are more likely to join the 
labor force than females. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
Unfortunately, we are not able to divide the age group 19–22 to different 
learning routes from the data, for instance, first year in 3–year college is treated as 
first year in 4 or 5 year university. Thus the marginal effect of hazard rate over sex 
and age group when an individual moves from age 16–18 to age 19–22 is the total 
effect of different routes. Therefore, we are unable to provide explanation for the 
differences in hazard marginal effect from the two age groups. In addition, as we limit 
the age of individuals in the data of school dropout analysis to 22, we are also unable 
to compare the later progression to master and doctor degree. 
6 Conclusions 
The study has examined the gender gap in wage among wage earners aged 15–60 
(15–55) for males (females) and school withdrawal (dropouts) hazard among 
individuals aged 7–22. There would be a corresponding higher school withdrawal 
(dropouts) rate among males while the schooling premium is generally higher for 
males than females. We also observe the wage incentives among women to complete 
junior, senior high school and 3–year college. The speed of withdrawal (dropouts) 
among males would be higher at the corresponding age groups. Besides, the younger 
generation is given a relatively higher education while the only co–residing son of the 
household head would have a similar benefit. Meanwhile, the employer types, which 
show a significant difference in wage, of the household heads and his spouses, in turn, 
would have a significant influence to the hazard of school withdrawal (dropouts) in 
the (grand) children co–residing in the household. More specifically, a combination 
between a head working for a state–owned firm and a head spouse working as the 
self–employed would decrease the hazard of dropout from school of the (grand) 
children to the lowest. 
 We acknowledge some limitations in our study. First is the limitation of the 
cross section data in use. The schooling premium may differ or change overtime 
according to the difference in returns to skills in the labor market (Heckman et al. 
1998). Similarly, the dropout in Panel 2 is just the figure of period 2007–2008 which 
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can be affected by the economic settings. However, to our best knowledge, there 
would be no panel data and/or longitude data from Vietnam to eradicate the problem. 
Second, the hazard model replies heavily from data selection and distributional 
assumptions. Third, there can be a problem of sample selection in hazard model as 
1,327 individuals (2.5 percent) in Panel 1 have never entered to any school. Fourth, 
omitted variables are always problems to both estimates of returns to schooling and 
estimates of hazard dropouts. For example, our estimates do not consider the 
difference in accessibility to school among individuals, quality of school and teachers 
as suggested by Glewwe and Kremer (2006). However, we prefer this to be able to 
estimate some key factors from the labor market as a guide to choose number of years 
in schooling. In addition, we are unable to distinguish the difference in career choices 
in post high school and link with the difference in the industries and occupational 
types. Nevertheless, we believe future studies would overcome our limitations when 
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Appendix 1 General descriptions of education system in Vietnam 
 
Since 1995, the Laws of Education in Vietnam have been changed two times, in 2005 
and 2009. However, the main characteristics of grade remain. Individuals enter 
primary school at age 6 as a compulsory education. After 5 years in primary school, 
individuals can enter to lower secondary school which lasts for 4 years. Right after 
lower secondary school, individuals have two choices but both require an entrance 
examination. The first is to enter upper secondary school for 3 years. The second is to 
join professional high school for 4 years whose graduates are recognized as 
equivalent to upper secondary school graduates plus a recognized degree in 
professional education and training (the degree holders have different wage ranking 
regulated by laws for employees in public sectors). After successfully passing the 
exams to be recognized as an upper secondary graduate, an individual can join 
entrance exams to the university which last for 4 or 5 years or for 3 year college 
which has lower requirement and less competitive entrance exams. The entrance 
exams to universities and colleges are regulated by Ministry of Education and 
Training in cooperation with each academic agent. Individuals are encouraged to take 
entrance exams to universities, if fails, their exams result is still usable for the 
selection to 3 year college.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics on the labor force in VHLSS 2008 
 
Category Total Males Males 
(%) 
Labor force 101,306 51,413 50.75 
1. Working 33,425 20,513 61.37 
2. Not working 67,881 30,900 45.52 
2.1 Self–employed in agriculture, forestry and fishery sectors 32,336  14,817 45.82 
2.2 Self–employed in other sectors than agriculture, forestry and 
fishery sectors 
12,208  5,211 42.69 
2.3 Do not have the first main job but have the second or third job 9,913  4,649 46.89 
2.4 Do housework only 3,457  276 7.98 
2.5 Cannot find a job 770  487 63.25 















Obs Mean Std. Err. Obs Mean Obs Mean 
log wage 33,425  2.084  0.644  20,513  2.139  12,912  1.998  
married (1 if married) 101,306  0.739  0.439  51,413  0.724  49,893  0.754  
age 101,306  36.330  11.612  51,413  36.524  49,893  36.130  
work experience (in years) 96,093  11.397  9.605  50,117  10.938  45,976  11.898  
rural (1 if in rural area) 101,306  0.749  0.433  51,413  0.755  49,893  0.744  
Red River Delta  101,306  0.186  0.389  51,413  0.184  49,893  0.189  
North East 101,306  0.148  0.356  51,413  0.149  49,893  0.148  
North West 101,306  0.056  0.230  51,413  0.055  49,893  0.057  
North Central Coast 101,306  0.096  0.295  51,413  0.096  49,893  0.096  
South Central Coast 101,306  0.087  0.281  51,413  0.087  49,893  0.087  
Central Highland 101,306  0.068  0.252  51,413  0.070  49,893  0.067  
Southeast 101,306  0.138  0.345  51,413  0.137  49,893  0.139  
Mekong River Delta 101,306  0.220  0.414  51,413  0.223  49,893  0.217  
No general education 101,306  0.187  0.390  51,413  0.162  49,893  0.212  
primary (school grad.) 101,306  0.278  0.448  51,413  0.275  49,893  0.282  
junior (high school grad.) 101,306  0.307  0.461  51,413  0.319  49,893  0.295  
senior (high school grad.) 101,306  0.172  0.378  51,413  0.186  49,893  0.158  
college (3–year) 101,306  0.015  0.120  51,413  0.012  49,893  0.018  
university (4 or 5 year) 101,306  0.039  0.194  51,413  0.044  49,893  0.034  
master (degree) 101,306  0.001  0.033  51,413  0.001  49,893  0.001  
phd  101,306  0.000  0.015  51,413  0.000  49,893  0.000  
other degree 101,306  0.001  0.024  51,413  0.001  49,893  0.000  
no vocational degree 101,306  0.901  0.298  51,413  0.882  49,893  0.922  
vocation 6 (months) 101,306  0.038  0.191  51,413  0.050  49,893  0.025  
vocation 1 (year) 101,306  0.020  0.142  51,413  0.029  49,893  0.012  
vocation 2 (year) 101,306  0.037  0.188  51,413  0.035  49,893  0.039  
vocation 3 (year) 101,306  0.003  0.058  51,413  0.004  49,893  0.003  
illiterate 101,306  0.064  0.245  51,413  0.049  49,893  0.080  
family firms 96,093  0.005  0.070  50,117  0.005  45,976  0.005  
family business 96,093  0.647  0.478  50,117  0.586  45,976  0.714  
household business 96,093  0.157  0.364  50,117  0.209  45,976  0.102  
state–owned firms 96,093  0.108  0.310  50,117  0.115  45,976  0.099  
collectives 96,093  0.006  0.080  50,117  0.007  45,976  0.005  
private firms 96,093  0.055  0.229  50,117  0.063  45,976  0.047  















Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
Obs Mean Obs Mean 
enrollment 53,160 0.666 0.472  27,744 0.643 25,416 0.691 
education (in years) 53,160 7.273 3.473  27,744 7.235 25,416 7.314 
age 53,160 14.557 4.160  27,744 14.673 25,416 14.430 
log household income 53,160 5.711 0.761  27,744 5.742 25,416 5.676 
Head's self–employed 53,160 0.725 0.446  27,744 0.728 25,416 0.722 
Head's in state–owned firms 53,160 0.056 0.230  27,744 0.055 25,416 0.057 
Head's in collectives 53,160 0.006 0.076  27,744 0.006 25,416 0.006 
Head's in private firms 53,160 0.028 0.165  27,744 0.028 25,416 0.028 
Head's in FDI firms 53,160 0.004 0.064  27,744 0.004 25,416 0.005 
Head spouse's self–employed 53,160 0.800 0.400  27,744 0.801 25,416 0.799 
Head spouse's in state–owned firms 53,160 0.041 0.198  27,744 0.040 25,416 0.042 
Head spouse's in collectives 53,160 0.002 0.045  27,744 0.002 25,416 0.002 
Head spouse's in private firms 53,160 0.015 0.120  27,744 0.015 25,416 0.014 
Head spouse's in FDI firms 53,160 0.006 0.078  27,744 0.006 25,416 0.006 
Head's education 47,662 7.518 3.899  24,882 7.490 22,780 7.549 
Head spouse education 51,833 6.491 3.996  27,061 6.461 24,772 6.523 
rural 53,160 0.789 0.408  27,744 0.790 25,416 0.787 
only son of the Head 53,160 0.202 0.386  27,744 0.387 25,416 0.000 
grand child of the Head 53,160 0.081 0.272  27,744 0.078 25,416 0.084 
age 7–11 53,160 0.261 0.439  27,744 0.258 25,416 0.264 
age 12–15 53,160 0.300 0.458  27,744 0.291 25,416 0.310 
age 16–18 53,160 0.246 0.430  27,744 0.242 25,416 0.249 
age 19–22 53,160 0.194 0.395  27,744 0.209 25,416 0.177 
Red River Delta  53,160 0.179 0.384  27,744 0.177 25,416 0.181 
North East 53,160 0.146 0.353  27,744 0.145 25,416 0.148 
North West 53,160 0.058 0.234  27,744 0.058 25,416 0.059 
North Central Coast 53,160 0.118 0.322  27,744 0.118 25,416 0.118 
South Central Coast 53,160 0.095 0.293  27,744 0.095 25,416 0.095 
Central Highland 53,160 0.091 0.287  27,744 0.092 25,416 0.090 
Southeast 53,160 0.129 0.335  27,744 0.129 25,416 0.128 














Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
Obs Mean Obs Mean 
enrollment 37,646  0.940  0.237  18,978  0.940  18,668  0.941  
education (in years) 37,646  7.106  3.395  18,978  7.004  18,668  7.210  
age 37,646  12.985  3.536  18,978  12.920  18,668  13.050  
log household income 37,646  5.758  0.759  18,978  5.786  18,668  5.729  
Head's self–employed 37,646  0.715  0.452  18,978  0.717  18,668  0.712  
Head's in state–owned firms 37,646  0.069  0.253  18,978  0.070  18,668  0.068  
Head's in collectives 37,646  0.007  0.081  18,978  0.007  18,668  0.007  
Head's in private firms 37,646  0.033  0.178  18,978  0.033  18,668  0.033  
Head's in FDI firms 37,646  0.005  0.069  18,978  0.004  18,668  0.005  
Head spouse's self–employed 37,646  0.789  0.408  18,978  0.791  18,668  0.787  
Head spouse's in state–owned firms 37,646  0.053  0.224  18,978  0.053  18,668  0.053  
Head spouse's in collectives 37,646  0.002  0.050  18,978  0.002  18,668  0.003  
Head spouse's in private firms 37,646  0.017  0.128  18,978  0.018  18,668  0.016  
Head spouse's in FDI firms 37,646  0.007  0.085  18,978  0.007  18,668  0.007  
Head's education 34,077  8.165  3.803  17,250  8.177  16,827  8.152  
Head spouse education 36,717  7.161  3.937  18,511  7.159  18,206  7.163  
rural 37,646  0.770  0.421  18,978  0.772  18,668  0.768  
only son of the Head 37,646  0.195  0.378  18,978  0.387  18,668  0.000  
grand child of the Head 37,646  0.099  0.298  18,978  0.096  18,668  0.101  
age 7–11 37,646  0.358  0.479  18,978  0.367  18,668  0.349  
age 12–15 37,646  0.372  0.483  18,978  0.370  18,668  0.373  
age 16–18 37,646  0.218  0.413  18,978  0.212  18,668  0.224  
age 19–22 37,646  0.052  0.223  18,978  0.051  18,668  0.053  
Red River Delta  37,646  0.201  0.401  18,978  0.202  18,668  0.200  
North East 37,646  0.146  0.353  18,978  0.144  18,668  0.147  
North West 37,646  0.050  0.218  18,978  0.053  18,668  0.046  
North Central Coast 37,646  0.132  0.339  18,978  0.133  18,668  0.132  
South Central Coast 37,646  0.103  0.304  18,978  0.103  18,668  0.103  
Central Highland 37,646  0.088  0.283  18,978  0.087  18,668  0.089  
Southeast 37,646  0.125  0.331  18,978  0.124  18,668  0.127  
Mekong River Delta 37,646  0.154  0.361  18,978  0.153  18,668  0.155  
ratio of tuition fee 37,521  0.115  0.160  18,910  0.117  18,611  0.113  
education subsidies 37,646  0.098  0.298  18,978  0.097  18,668  0.100  
scholarship 37,646  0.140  0.347  18,978  0.116  18,668  0.165  





Table 5 Wage function estimates 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
 










sex –0.184*** 0.0191  –0.438*** 0.0091  
  
age 0.0345*** 0.0020  –0.0180*** 0.0005  
  
age^2 –0.000428*** 0.0000  
    
work experience 0.0235*** 0.0013  
    
work experience^2 –0.000246*** 0.0000  
    
rural –0.0784*** 0.0094  –0.313*** 0.0108  
  
North East 0.0191 0.0166  –0.607*** 
   
North West 0.113*** 0.0296  –1.013*** 0.0265  
  
North Central Coast –0.0540*** 0.0146  –0.428*** 0.0181  
  
South Central Coast 0.0369*** 0.0099  –0.0255 0.0180  
  
Central Highland 0.161*** 0.0198  –0.625*** 0.0213  
  
Southeast 0.227*** 0.0091  0.103*** 0.0159  
  
Mekong River Delta 0.0710*** 0.0093  –0.133*** 0.0146  
  
primary (school grad.) 0.0743*** 0.0130  –0.0763*** 0.0157  
  
junior (high school grad.) 0.0922*** 0.0131  –0.0185 0.0161  
  
senior (high school grad.) 0.140*** 0.0147  0.125*** 0.0185  
  
college (3–year) 0.310*** 0.0400  1.631*** 0.0417  
  
university (4 or 5 year) 0.494*** 0.0369  1.749*** 0.0309  
  
master (degree) 0.779*** 0.0709  1.996*** 0.1950  
  
phd  0.573*** 0.1220  7.304 – 
  
other degree 0.330*** 0.0885  1.174*** 0.1910  
  
sex*primary –0.0255 0.0191  
    
sex*junior 0.0451** 0.0188  
    
sex*senior 0.0619*** 0.0190  
    
sex*college 0.0949*** 0.0326  
    
sex*university 0.0600** 0.0233  
    
sex*master 0.0695 0.0970  
    
sex*phd 0.416 0.2660  
    
sex*other degree 0.252 0.1740  
    
vocation 6 (months) 0.0194 0.0194  0.682*** 0.0220  
  
vocation 1 (year) 0.0588** 0.0232  0.801*** 0.0305  
  
vocation 2 (year) 0.0956*** 0.0278  1.173*** 0.0249  
  
vocation 3 (year) 0.115*** 0.0380  1.126*** 0.0780  
  
illiterate –0.0459*** 0.0161  0.0389* 0.0234 
  
state–owned firms 0.189*** 0.0114  
    
collectives –0.0479** 0.0204  
    
private firms 0.153*** 0.0090  
    
FDI firms 0.296*** 0.0141  
    
married 
  
–0.164*** 0.0117  
  
lambda 
    
–0.0803** 0.0361 
Constant 1.528*** 0.0487 0.785*** 0.0272  
  




Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients included but not 
displayed are 87 dummies for 88 industries where the employers have main business, and 33 dummies 




Table 6 Gender gap in probability to leave school in Panel 1 
 
  (1)   (2) 
 
VARIABLES Haz. Ratio Robust Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Robust Std. Err. 
sex 0.766*** 0.0192 0.840*** 0.0192 
log household income 0.608*** 0.0192 0.786*** 0.0118 
Head's self–employed   0.999 0.0361 
Head's in state–owned firms   0.877** 0.0458 
Head's in collectives   0.966 0.124 
Head's in private firms   0.999 0.0691 
Head's in FDI firms   1.625*** 0.219 
Head spouse's self–employed   0.900*** 0.0335 
Head spouse's in state–owned firms   0.904 0.0567 
Head spouse's in collectives   0.973 0.185 
Head spouse's in private firms   0.964 0.0845 




Head spouses' education 
  
0.921*** 0.00331 
rural 1.245*** 0.0277 1.052** 0.0272 
only son of the Head 0.936*** 0.0209 0.989 0.0241 
grand child of the Head 0.819*** 0.04 0.482*** 0.0457 
age 12–15 2.009*** 0.233 1.902*** 0.236 
age 16–18 3.438*** 0.39 3.176*** 0.385 
age 19–22 5.196*** 0.589 4.292*** 0.519 
sex*age 7–11 1.119 0.181 0.893 0.16 
sex*age 12–15 1.009 0.0543 0.945 0.0552 
sex*age 16–18 0.984 0.0342 0.941 0.0366 
North East 1.284*** 0.0312 1.133*** 0.032 
North West 1.559*** 0.0566 1.191*** 0.0479 
North Central Coast 0.947* 0.0283 0.959 0.0331 
South Central Coast 1.172*** 0.0365 0.846*** 0.0316 
Central Highland 1.758*** 0.0587 1.228*** 0.0467 
Southeast 1.894*** 0.057 1.158*** 0.0407 
Mekong River Delta 2.482*** 0.0621 1.367*** 0.0422 
Observations 51,833   45,191 
 




Table 7 Gender gap in probability to leave school in Panel 2 
 
  (1)   (2) 
 






sex 0.656*** 0.054 0.688*** 0.0598 
log household income 0.843*** 0.0275 0.928** 0.0342 
Head's self–employed   1.041 0.0925 
Head's in state–owned firms   0.970 0.106 
Head's in collectives   1.198 0.282 
Head's in private firms   1.305* 0.191 
Head's in FDI firms   1.704 0.594 
Head spouse's self–employed   1.255** 0.129 
Head spouse's in state–owned firms   1.037 0.14 
Head spouse's in collectives   1.055 0.449 
Head spouse's in private firms   1.304 0.272 




Head spouses' education 
  
0.977** 0.00905 
rural 1.122** 0.0566 1.022 0.0562 
only son of the Head 0.916 0.0534 0.910 0.0566 
grand child of the Head 0.918 0.107 0.899 0.175 
age 12–15 0.146*** 0.0345 0.133*** 0.0353 
age 16–18 0.0294*** 0.00763 0.0311*** 0.00882 
age 19–22 0.0169*** 0.00451 0.0172*** 0.005 
sex*age 7–11 1.327 0.333 0.940 0.27 
sex*age 12–15 1.172 0.185 1.131 0.193 
sex*age 16–18 1.373*** 0.128 1.269** 0.125 
North East 1.272*** 0.0702 1.315*** 0.0785 
North West 1.117 0.108 1.182* 0.119 
North Central Coast 0.989 0.0641 0.973 0.0684 
South Central Coast 0.936 0.0691 0.877 0.0711 
Central Highland 1.034 0.0917 1.004 0.0943 
Southeast 0.775*** 0.0682 0.738*** 0.0708 
Mekong River Delta 1.158** 0.076 1.007 0.0762 
ratio of tuition fee over total expenditure on 
education 
0.311*** 0.0393 0.299*** 0.0408 
education subsidies 1.123 0.097 1.028 0.103 
scholarship 0.700*** 0.0506 0.708*** 0.0573 
tuition fee reduction 0.934 0.0561 0.929 0.0602 
Observations 37,414   32,939 
 





Table 8 Marginal effect of log wage over sex and degree obtained  
 




sex#diploma exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| 
sex#no degree 7.832  0.000  6.413  0.000  
sex#primary 8.288  0.000  6.534  0.000  
sex#junior 8.339  0.000  7.122  0.000  
sex#senior 9.419  0.000  8.225  0.000  
sex#college 13.398  0.000  13.327  0.000  
sex#university 18.028  0.000  16.312  0.000  
sex#master 25.242  0.000  22.421  0.000  
sex#phd 23.027  0.000  27.533  0.000  
sex#upper degree – sex#lower degree exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| 
no degree–primary 1.579  0.000  1.128  0.226  
primary–junior 1.052  0.520  1.801  0.000  
junior–senior 2.945  0.000  3.015  0.000  
senior–college 53.466  0.000  164.315  0.000  
senior–univesity 5,478.685  0.000  3,251.152  0.000  
university–master 1,358.479  0.000  449.724  0.000  





Table 9 Marginal effect of hazard rate to withdraw from school over sex and group of 
age in Panel 1, Analysis 1. 
 




sex#age group exp(b) Pr>|z| exp(b) Pr>|z| 
sex#age 7–11 0.106  0.000  0.095  0.000  
sex#age 12–15 0.207  0.000  0.168  0.000  
sex#age 16–18 0.340  0.000  0.271  0.000  
sex#age 19–22 0.546  0.000  0.430  0.000  
sex#upper age – sex#lower age exp(b) Pr>|z| exp(b) Pr>|z| 
age 7–11 to 12–15 1.106  0.000  1.076  0.000  
age 12–15 to 16–18 1.142  0.000  1.108  0.000  
age 16–18 to 19–22 1.229  0.000  1.173  0.000  
 
 
